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a b s t r a c t
Intra-group transfers are riskmanagement tools that are usually widely used to optimise the risk position
of an insurance group. In this paper, it is shown that premium and liability transfers could be optimally
made in such a way as to reduce the amount of Technical Provisions and Minimum Capital Requirement
for the entire insurance conglomerate. These levels of required capital represent the minimal amount
that needs to be held by the insurance group without regulator intervention, according to the Solvency
II regulation. We assume that only proportional risk transfers are feasible, since such transfers are not
difficult to administer for a large scaled insurance group, as is always the case. In addition, any risk
shifting should be made for commercial purposes in order to be considered acceptable by the local
regulators that impose restrictions on how much the assets within an insurance group are fungible. Our
numerical examples illustrate the efficiency of the optimal proportional risk transfers which can easily
be implemented, in terms of computation, in any well-known solver even for an insurance conglomerate
withmany subsidiaries. We found that our proposed optimal proportional allocations aremore beneficial
for large insurance group, since the relative reduction in capital requirement tends to be small, whereas
the gain in absolute terms is quite significant for large scaled insurance group.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
An insurance group (IG) is composed of multiple legal entities,
also known as insurance undertakings (IU’s), that may operate
under different regulation regimes. Diversification across an IG
represents a risk management tool, often used to reduce the risk
exposures, and consequently the required level of capital within
the organisation. The risk exposures of different entities will in
general not be perfectly positively correlated, and thus some group
level diversification is observed (see Keller, 2007). On the other
hand, assets and liabilities are not pooled across entities, since
there are limits to the cross-subsidy (especially when conceptually
different regulatory requirements are in place for various IU’s), as
well as the capital fungibility, within the group. Nonetheless, the
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0167-6687/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articrisk and capital requirements of individual entities can be reduced,
through a web of capital and risk transfer arrangements across
entities. This capital efficiency can be understood as a result of
down-streaming of diversification (see Keller, 2007).
The complexity of group legal structures and intra-group
risk transfers, with entities being potentially subject to different
regulatory regimes, poses a major challenge for regulators, since
it requires producing equivalence assessments between these
regimes. For example, the EU and Swiss regulatory requirements
are equivalent (see EIOPA, 2011), but no agreement has been
achieved between these two regulatory bodies and the North
American regulators. Therefore, it is not surprising that studying
this problem has become a keen interest for practitioners and
academics. The work of Filipović and Kupper (2008) investigates
optimal risk transfers in a framework where a finite set of risk
transfer instruments is available and the capital requirements of
individual entities are calculated via convex risk measures. The
paper of Gatzert and Schmeiser (2011) studies the impact of group
diversification on shareholder value, considering a variety of group
structures and capital and risk transfer instruments, while also
offering a thorough literature review of diversification in financial
le under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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of group building on policyholder welfare. In their analysis, it is
assumed that a particular type of rational risk transfer arrangement
is enforced, while the group sets premium and equity targets in
order to maximise shareholder value, allowing for the impact of
entities’ default risk on insurance demand. A recent paper of Asimit
et al. (2013) investigates the optimal intra-group transfer in an IG
consisting of two IU’s, where liabilities are assumed to be perfect
positively associated.
An ambitious project, started more than a decade ago, has
been initiated in order to harmonise the regulatory environment
within the European Union (EU) insurance industry, which is
known as Solvency II. This unified methodology applies to all
insurance players that operate in the EU insurance market and
its legal framework is specified in European Commission (2009).
The actual implementation of Solvency II is expected to be
put in practice in several years, and in the meantime, various
Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) have been performed. These
QIS’s were meant to collect feedback from various insurance
and reinsurance companies related to the constantly augmented
Solvency II specifications. Themost recent one, also known asQIS 5
(see European Commission, 2010), summarises the most probable
recommendations that will later lead to the implementation of
Solvency II.
In this paper, the optimal risk transfer within an EU non-life
IG is considered. That is, all entities are located within EU or an
equivalence assessment has been approved for the IU’s outside this
economic region. In other words, the regulatory regime designed
within the Solvency II equally applies to the entire IG. Since there
are significant regulatory differences between life and non-life
businesses, it is assumed that the IG is purely a non-life insurance
one. Note that some non-life businesses, such as health insurance
or workers’ compensation, are similar in nature to life insurance
activities from the regulatory point of view, and therefore the
capital requirements follow the life insurance evaluation. These
hybrid businesses are excluded from our analysis, so that we could
better understand the risk transfer effects within a pure non-life
IG.
Optimising the risk intra-group transfers represents a practical
problem that has not been discussed much in the framework of
Solvency II, but there exists a rich literature on similar problems
that exhibit a reduced level of complexity. One research stream is
the optimal reinsurance contract problem that was first discussed
by Borch (1960) and Arrow (1963) who consider the objectives
of minimising the variance of the insurer’s retained risk and
maximising the expected utility of the insurer’s final wealth,
respectively. Alternative decision criteria have been investigated
by many researchers (see for example, Van Heerwaarden et al.,
1989, Young, 1999, Verlaak and Beirlant, 2003, Kaluszka and
Okolewski, 2008, Guerra and Centeno, 2008 etc.). Decisions based
on Value-at-risk (VaR) and Conditional Value-at-risk (CVaR) are
considered by Cai et al. (2008), Cheung (2010) and Chi and Tan
(2011). A recent paper of Asimit et al. (2015) identifies the optimal
reinsurance contract by taking into account the Solvency II capital
requirements. Note that the optimal reinsurance approach finds
the ideal reinsurance contract between two insurance players,
namely, insurer and reinsurer, where the risk shifting is usually
initiated by the insurer in order to meet the solvency targets. A
more cooperative approach is the so-called optimal risk allocation
problem that has a long history. Under this setting, the players have
their own targets and try to efficiently share their risks in a way
that is mutual beneficiary to all risk holders, i.e. finding the Pareto
optimal risk transfers. The vast literature on this topic includes
Landsberger and Meilljson (1994), Ludkovski and Young (2009),
Kiesel and Rüschendorf (2009, 2010), Carlier et al. (2012) etc. An
excellent review on this topic has appeared in Rüschendorf (2013).In summary, themain aimof this paper is to identify the optimal
risk allocation within a non-life IG such that the total IG minimum
level of capital is reduced as much as possible. The paper is
organised as follows: Section 2 provides the necessary background
on Solvency II and describes our setting, while Section 3 contains
a case study that numerically illustrates our previous findings; the
main conclusions of the paper are summarised in Section 4.
2. Capital requirements model
The main purpose of the paper is to explain how an IG may ef-
ficiently share their various risk portfolios in order to reduce the
capital requirements. The chosen regulatory environment is the
Solvency II Regime that applies to a large economic area and there-
fore, it is likely to consider the problemof capital efficiency of an in-
surance conglomerate. In Section 3, we will consider the economic
value captured by the IG when implementing such risk manage-
ment tools. In order to define the ultimate objective function that
we need to optimise, we need to describe the capital requirements
model used in this paper, which is a replication of the current Sol-
vency II recommendations, as defined in previous QIS’s such as
QIS4 (see European Commission, 2008) and QIS5 (for example, see
European Commission, 2010). Recall that QIS5 provides a signif-
icant augmentation to QIS4, not only on the parameter values of
the considered proxy models, but there are conceptual differences
in implementing the Solvency II recommendations.
We assume that we have an IG consisting of n IU’s that operates
under the Solvency II Regime and each IU holdsm lines of business
(LOB’s). There are twelve LOB’s recognised within Solvency II,
which are non-life insurance, while three other LOB’s are non-
life insurance, but the corresponding capital requirements follow
the life insurance evaluation. The capital requirements are set up
for a finite time horizon, which is one year for Solvency II. The
EU regulatory regime requires capital to be put aside in order to
cover the technical provisions (TP) and additional capital. The TP’s
are evaluated per LOB, and each of them consists of best estimate
(BE) of the liabilities and its risk margin (RM) (see for example,
CEIOPS, 2010). The additional capital is defined asMinimumCapital
Requirement (MCR) and Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR). MCR is
viewed as the lower bound of the SCR, and immediate regulatory
intervention is in force once an IU holds capital at levels lower
than its MCR. The SCR calculations within an IG are very complex,
and lead to individual calculations for stand-alone IU’s and IG
calculations by taking into account the consolidated balance sheet
(where the risk transfers cannot be used as a risk management
tool), but each IU should calculate their very own SCR, called the
individual SCR. The MCR calculations are much simpler, and at a
group level, the total MCR equals to the sum of all MCR’s. Besides
the fact that MCR and SCR are calculated in a different manner,
the required own funds to cover these levels of capital should
satisfy certain requirements. As expected, the requirements are
more stringent for the assets that are allowed to reach the MCR
level than the SCR level.
As explained above, the IG’s objective is to reduce as much as
possible the total amount of TP and MCR by keeping the current
global business volume intact. Thismay be achieved by considering
risk transfers among the IU’s, which should be acceptable to the
local regulators. One major impediment is that assets are not
fully fungible and not surprisingly, a risk transfer is considered
acceptable to a local regulator as long as it has a commercial
purpose. There aremanyways of transferring the future premiums
and liabilities within different IU’s, but it is obvious that
proportional allocations would be the easiest to implement from
the administrative point of view and at the same time to become
acceptable for various local regulators. Therefore, the set of feasible
transfers assumed in this paper consists of transferring premiums
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proportion of business volume, pertaining to the kth LOB, received
by the ith IU from the jth IU. The case in which i = j should be
understood as the remaining business held by the jth IU. Clearly,
n
i=1
xijk = 1, xijk ≥ 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
In addition, it is assumed that all transfers are made at the same
time.
We now explain the Solvency II terminology for calculating
the three major capital requirements components: BE, RM and
MCR. The first component is relatively simple, and each IU should
report the BE’s gross and net of ‘‘reinsurance’’. Since the BE
represents the expected value of future liabilities, the IG’s total
amount of BE’s remains the same on both calculation methods and
more importantly, it is not sensitive to any kind of risk shifting.
Consequently, our model may discard the BE contributions to the
TP.
Themost granularmethodology is related to the RMcalculation.
Note that the RM’s are evaluated without allowing any diversifi-
cation between different LOB’s of any particular IU, and therefore
calculations are extremely simplified. In addition, RM calculations
take into account only four sources of risk: underwriting (UwR), un-
avoidable market (UMR), counterparty default (CDR) and operational
(OpR). The calculations for the UwR risk include the premium (PR)
and reserve (RR) risks.
Let RM ik be the corresponding RM for the kth LOB of the ith IU.
Recall that RM’s are calculated per LOB, and the total RM for a given
IU is given by summing the individual RM’s (see CEIOPS, 2009,
2010). Therefore, the IG’s total RM capital requirements becomes:
RM IG :=
n
i=1
m
k=1
RM ik. (2.1)
Note that the calculations of OpR for a non-life IG is simplified to
SCROpRik := 0.03Pgross−1,ik +max

0.03Pgross−1,ik − 1.1Pgross−2,ik, 0

,
where Pgross−1,ik and P
gross
−2,ik are gross (of reinsurance and intra-group
transfer) earned premium received by the ith IU for the kth LOB
during the last year and year before last year, respectively. Note
that the earned premiums are calculated in this paper via the
accounting method due to its simplicity, especially when defining
the net earned premiums needed for the PR calculations. Clearly,
the OpR contribution to the capital requirements is evaluated gross
of any risk transfer, and therefore, our optimisation problem may
neglect this capital requirement component, which is not the case
for the remaining four risks. Thus, after removing the OpR, the
mathematical formulation for each RM ik follows the Cost-of-Capital
approach and is given by:
λ

SCRtfik +
1+ r
2

Durmodik − nik

Durmodik − nik + 1

1rnikBE
net
ik
+ SCRCDRik

, (2.2)
where
(i) λ = CoC/(1 + r) is the adjustment coefficient with CoC
and r being the Cost-of-Capital rate and annual risk-free rate,
respectively;
(ii) SCRtfik represents the current SCR for the kth LOB of the ith IU,
excluding market risk and default for financial derivatives;
(iii) Durmodik defines the modified duration of BE
net
ik ;
(iv) nik is the longest duration of available risk-free financial
instruments to cover the liabilities corresponding to the kth
LOB of the ith IU;(v) 1rnik represents the absolute decrease of the risk-free interest
for maturity nik under a downward stress scenario of the
interest rate risk sub-module;
(vi) BEnetik defines the net BE provisions for the claims outstanding
in the kth LOB of the ith IU;
(vii) SCRCDRik is the current capital charge for the default risk within
the kth LOB of all transfers made by the ith IU.
It is common sense to have thatDurmodik = Durmodk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
i.e. the modified duration depends only on the nature of the busi-
ness rather than being geographically specific for similar insurance
risks. Now, several recommendations have beenmade for calculat-
ing the previously-mentioned quantities. The first simplification
is for computing SCRtfik , where only the PR and RR risks are taken
into account. These risks are assumed to be LogNormal distributed
withmeans Pnetik and BE
net
ik , and coefficients of variationσ
PR
ik andσ
RR
ik ,
where
(i) σ PRik and σ
RR
ik represent the standard deviation for PR and RR,
respectively, corresponding to the kth LOB of the ith IU, as
defined by the Solvency II Standard Formula;
(ii) Pnetik is the net (of reinsurance and intra-group transfer) earned
premium in the kth LOB of the ith IU during the forthcoming
year.
Note that for a LogNormal random variable, Z , with mean µ and
coefficient of variation σ , we have
VaRp(Z)− E(Z) = µ

exp{Φ−1(p)√1+ σ 2}√
1+ σ 2 − 1

,
where VaRp(Z) andΦ−1(p) are the p% percentile of the distribution
function of Z and standard normal, respectively. Denote
g(t) :=
exp

Φ−1(p)

log

1+ t2
√
1+ t2 − 1. (2.3)
According to QIS5, p = 99.5% and
SCRtfik
:=

g

σ PRik

Pnetik
2
+

g

σ RRik

BEnetik
2
+ 2 αg

σ PRik

g

σ RRik

Pnetik BE
net
ik ,
(2.4)
where α (usually is 0.5) represents the correlation coefficient
between PR and RR, as defined by the Standard Formula. Market
wide estimates for σ are shown to be between 5% and 22%,
and therefore, a reasonable approximation, g(σ ) ≈ 3σ , has
been proposed in QIS4 and QIS5, but we prefer to work with
the formulation displayed in Eq. (2.4) in order to achieve a more
accurate evaluation of the capital requirements. The general rule
in Solvency II for the proportional evaluation of the risk leads to
Pnetik :=
n
j=1
xijkP
gross
jk and BE
net
ik :=
n
j=1
xijkBE
gross
jk , (2.5)
where Pgrossjk is the gross earned premium in the kth LOB of the jth IU
during the forthcoming year before making any transfer. Note that
diversification among LOB’s or IU’s is not allowed in the calculation
of the RM’s. In addition, σ PRik = σ PRk and σ RRik = σ RRk are assumed to
be constant among all IU, and their tentative values are tabulated in
Section 2 of European Commission (2010), but one should keep in
mind that the calibration process is still under development, which
is one of the scopes of each QIS.
The second term from relation (2.2) represents the contribution
of the UMR, which is a simplification recommended in Section 2
of European Commission (2010). The same reference provides
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defined for two classes of exposures. According to the Solvency
II terminology, the intra-group transfers belong to the class of
type 1 exposures. In addition, common practice suggests the same
probability of default (PD) for all IU’s, which is usually estimated
from external ratings or based on the IG solvency ratio (SR) (i.e. the
ratio between IG total own funds and capital requirements).
Moreover, for regulation purposes, the IGneeds to evaluate the Loss
Given Default (LGD) for each subsidiary, where the LGD represents
the loss of basic own funds which a subsidiary would incur if the
another subsidiary or subsidiaries default. The LGD is amended
by 1 − RecR, where RecR represents the recovery rate of the IU,
and the European Commission recommendations include that the
RecR’s should be estimated based on the specific risk profile of each
subsidiary. Thus, without loss of generality, it is further assumed
that all LOB’s of a single IU have the same RecR, but different
values may arise among distinct IU’s. Whenever robust estimation
of the RecR is not possible, the recommendation is to use the 50%
benchmark value. The capital requirements for type 1 exposures is
recommended to be
SCRCDRik :=

3

Vik,

Vik ≤ 5%

j≠i
LGDik
min

j≠i
LGDjk, 5

Vik

,

Vik > 5%

j≠i
LGDik,
where Vik and LGDik represent the variance of the loss distribution
of the type 1 exposures and LGD in the ith LOB of the ith IU. This
formulation may lead to arbitrage opportunities, which can be
removed by considering the following reformulation:
SCRCDRik := min

j≠i
LGDjk, l

Vik

, (2.6)
where l is a constant.
The LGDik results from the potential loss in own funds due to PR
and RR risks, and one needs to take advantage of the LogNormal
assumption. It is not difficult to find that a LogNormal random
variable, Z , with mean µ and coefficient of variation σ , satisfies
E

Z − VaRp(Z) | Z > VaRp(Z)

= µ
1− pΦ

log

1+ σ 2− Φ−1(p)− VaRp(Z),
whereΦ is the distribution function of a standard normal random
variable. Denote
h(t) :=
Φ

log

1+ t2− Φ−1(p)
1− p − g(t)− 1, (2.7)
where function g is defined in Eq. (2.3). Since the capital
requirements are set at VaR99.5% level, then we have
LGDik := (1− RecRi)
×

h

σ PRik

Pnetik
2
+

h

σ RRik

BEnetik
2
+ 2 αh

σ PRik

h

σ RRik

Pnetik BE
net
ik ,
(2.8)
where once again α = 0.5 and p = 99.5%. As anticipated, RecRi
represent the recovery rate corresponding to the ith IU.
The Vik takes into account the default within the kth LOB
of all other IU’s, except for the ith IU. Due to the dependence
between these default events, the evaluation of the variance Vik
should include the concomitant default events, which makes the
calculations quite laborious if all concomitant default events are
included. Since the PD for multiple IU at the same time decreasessignificantly once the number of insolvent IU’s increases, it is
further assumed that nomore than two concomitant default events
may occur at the same time. Note that in these situations, we may
aggregate the defaulted amounts if the assets are non-fungible,
which is normally the case, unless a legally binded contract is
in force (for further details, see Keller, 2007). Therefore, Lik, the
random loss in own funds for the kth LOB of the ith IU, is given
by
Lik :=
LGDjk, if only the jth IU defaults, j ≠ i
LGDj1k + LGDj2k, if only the j1th
and j2th IU’s default, j1 < j2, j1, j2 ≠ i.
The PD’s do not vary among different IU’s, and for this reason,
we may denote p1 and p2 to be the PD of a single default only
and concomitant default, respectively. Within QIS5, there are
recommended values for the PD (single or concomitant) of an IU
and are equal to p1+p2(n−1). It is expected that the concomitant
events are stochastically positively dependent, which implies that
PD2 ≤ p2. Thus, one may require to have PD2 ≤ p2 ≤ PD/(n− 1).
Simple calculations show that
E

Lik
 = p1
j≠i
LGDjk + p2

j1<j2,j1,j2≠i

LGDj1k + LGDj2k

= PD

j≠i
LGDjk
and
E

L2ik
 = p1
j≠i
LGD2jk + p2

j1<j2,j1,j2≠i

LGDj1k + LGDj2k
2
= PD

j≠i
LGD2jk + 2p2

j1<j2,j1,j2≠i
LGDj1kLGDj2k
= p2

j≠i
LGDjk
2
+ (PD− p2)

j≠i
LGD2jk.
Thus, the latter equations and (2.6) yield that
SCRCDRik
:= min

j≠i
LGDjk, l
p2 − PD2
j≠i
LGDjk
2
+ (PD− p2)

j≠i
LGD2jk
 .
It is worth mentioning that an IG that is financially stable may
simplify the CDR calculations as follows:
SCRCDRik = l
p2 − PD2 
j≠i
LGDjk
2
+ (PD− p2)

j≠i
LGD2jk.
(2.9)
Note that the positiveness of PD− p2 implies that the above is true
as long as l2PD2−l2PD+1 ≥ 0 or equivalently if PD(1−PD) ≤ 1/l2.
If l = 3 then the latter is satisfied whenever PD ≤ 12.73%, which
is true, according to the QIS 5 recommendations (see European
Commission, 2010), for an IG with a B rating or higher or any
unrated IG (i.e. any possible SR satisfies our sufficient condition
whenever the IG is unrated). Similarly, if l = 5 then we should
have PD ≤ 4.17%, which is true for an IG with a BB rating or
higher or a SR larger than 80% for an unrated IG. Consequently,
the simplified formula from (2.9) can be utilised for an IG with a
reasonable financial stability.
Finally, we need to define theMCR contribution to our objective
function, i.e. the IG’s total MCR, MCRIG. As anticipated, the latter
quantity is obtained by aggregating all MCR’s:
MCRIG :=
n
i=1
MCRi, (2.10)
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ith IU. EachMCR includes the linearMCR for pure non-life business
and for non-life business similar to life business. Sincewe dealwith
a pure non-life IG, the second component is not present in this
model. Therefore,
MCRi :=
m
k=1
max

αkBEnetik , βkP
net
−1,ik

, (2.11)
where αk and βk are some constants, while Pnet−1,ik represents the
net (of reinsurance and intra-group transfer) written premiums
within the kth LOB of the ith IU (for details, see Section 4 of
European Commission, 2010). It is worth mentioning that each
MCR is assumed to lie between 20% and 50% of the corresponding
individual SCR, which has been confirmed by empirical evidence
accumulated in the results of the QIS5 among the EU IG’s, when
the Standard formula of Solvency II was implemented. Finally, by
putting together relations (2.5), (2.10) and (2.11), onemay find that
the total RM is given by:
MCRIG =
n
i=1
m
k=1
max

αk
n
j=1
xijkBE
gross
jk , βkP
net
−1,ik

. (2.12)
3. Numerical examples
In this section, we discuss the implementation of our optimi-
sation problem and provide a numerical example to illustrate the
effect of the proposed risk transfer methodology. First, we need
to rewrite the optimisation problem such that the new formula-
tion is implementable in any well-known optimisation software.
For the sake of simplicity, the following notations are made for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ m:
aik = Pgrossik , bik = BEgrossik ,
cik = λ

1+ r
2

dk − nik

dk − nik + 1

1rnik

, dk = Durmodk ,
e1 = l2

p2 − PD2

, e2 = l2

PD− p2

, Pik = βkPnet−1,ik,
sk = λg

σ PRk

, tk = λg

σ RRk

,
uk = λh

σ PRk

, vk = λh

σ RRk

,
where the function g and h are defined in (2.3) and (2.7). In
addition, define f (x, y) := x2 + y2 + xy and
Fik(x) := (1− RecRi)f

uk
n
l=1
xilk alk, vk
n
l=1
xilk blk

.
Clearly, a combination of (2.1), (2.2), (2.4), (2.5), (2.8), (2.9) and
(2.12) yield that our optimisation problem is given by:
min
x∈ℜn×n×m
m
k=1
n
i=1

f

sk
n
j=1
xijk ajk, tk
n
j=1
xijk bjk

+ cik
n
j=1
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
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xijk bjk, Pik

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
j≠i
F 2jk(x),

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Fjk(x)

s.t.
n
j=1
xijk = 1, xijk ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
(3.1)
The above unconstrained optimisation problem is economically
sound if each IU has sufficient assets to cover its TP and MCR afterTable 3.1
The values of αk , βk , σ PRk , σ
RR
k and dk , where the first four quantities are chosen as
defined in QIS5.
k LOBk αk βk σ PRk σ
RR
k dk
1 Motor, third-party liability 12% 13% 10% 9.5% 2.3
2 Motor, other classes 13% 9% 7% 10% 1.86
3 Marine, aviation, transport 18% 22% 17% 14% 2.03
4 Fire and other property damage 14% 13% 10% 11% 1.56
5 Third-party liability 14% 20% 15% 11% 3.79
6 Credit and suretyship 25% 28% 21.5% 19% 2.72
7 Legal expenses 12% 9% 6.5% 9% 1.45
8 Assistance 14% 7% 5% 11% 1.75
9 Miscellaneous 20% 17% 13% 15% 3.03
the transfers have beenmade. Recall that for the sake of exposition,
our model excludes the BE’s and OpR contribution to the RM, since
both are gross of any risk transfers. Therefore, let us denote by Ai
the available assets held (before the risk transfers take place) by the
ith IU, where the BE’s and OpR contribution to the RM calculations
are removed. A set of transfers is feasible if each IU holds sufficient
own funds to cover the new portfolio of liabilities. Therefore, the
optimisation problem from (3.1) should be augmented by adding
the following set of inequality constraints:
m
k=1

f

sk
n
j=1
xijk ajk, tk
n
j=1
xijk bjk

+ cik
n
j=1
xijk bjk +max

αk
n
j=1
xijk bjk, Pik

+ min
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j≠i
Fjk(x)
2
+ e2
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j≠i
F 2jk(x),
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≤ Ai +

j≠i
m
k=1

xijkajk − xjikaik

, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (3.2)
A detailed discussion on the convexity of the above objective
function and constraints is presented in the Appendix, where we
propose a reformulation of our optimisation problem as a Mixed
Integer Nonlinear Programming (MINLP) problem. For numerical
purposes, the optimal problem displayed in Eq. (A.2) from
Appendix is implemented using the General Algebraic Modeling
System (GAMS), a high performing solver which accommodates
our setting very well. Table 3.1 provides the values for α’s, β ’s and
σ ’s parameters as suggested in QIS5 (for details, see Sections 2 and
4 of European Commission, 2010). In addition, realistic values for
dk are also provided in Table 3.1, which have been chosen after
consulting many UK based non-life insurance companies. Among
the twelve pure non-life LOB’s, we chose only nine, i.e. m = 9,
since the other three refer to reinsurance, which without loss of
generality are excluded from ourmodel since our aim is to allocate
efficiently the IG’s assets and liabilitieswithout reducing its overall
business volume.
It is also assumed that the gross earned premiums for the
forthcoming year and net written premiums in the previous year
are the same for all LOB’s and IU’s, i.e. Pnet−1,ik = aik. In addition,
the annual risk-free interest is 4%. As it can be seen in Table 3.1,
the possible maximal maturity for the risk-free interest is three
years. The values for 1rn are suggested in Section 2 of European
Commission (2010), where the downward stress scenarios are
defined to a reduction in the annual risk-free interest of 75%, 65%
and 56% for a maturity of one, two and three years, respectively.
Thus, 1rn equals to 3%, 2.6% and 2.24% for a maturity of one, two
and three years, respectively. It is widely accepted that a value of
6% for CoC is the most appropriate choice, and thus, λ = 6%/1.04.
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Sensible values of Pgross ’s and BEgross ’s for all three IU’s (figures are in millions).
k LOBk P
gross
1k P
gross
2k P
gross
3k BE
gross
1k BE
gross
2k BE
gross
3k
1 Motor, third-party liability 1015 1218 812 700 840 560
2 Motor, other classes 672 806.4 537.6 480 576 384
3 Marine, aviation,
transport
29.4 35.28 23.52 21 25.2 16.8
4 Fire and other property
damage
490 588 392 280 336 224
5 Third-party liability 558 669.6 446.4 360 432 288
6 Credit and suretyship 86.4 103.68 69.12 48 57.6 38.4
7 Legal expenses 28 33.6 22.4 20 24 16
8 Assistance 42 50.4 33.6 30 36 24
9 Miscellaneous 72.5 87 58 50 60 40
Our numerical examples assume an IG with three IU’s, i.e. n =
3, and we report in Table 3.2 the best estimate of liabilities and
earned premiums for each IU and LOB. The values for the first IU
are chosen to be similar to those of Aviva Insurance Limited which
can be found on their publicly available statement of solvency. For
the second IU, the best estimates of liabilities are taken to be 20%
higher,while for the third IU they are 20% lower; the corresponding
security loadings necessary for premium calculations are kept
constant for all LOB’s. Note that the values for cik are computed via
the formula from the beginning of this section by using nik = ⌊dik⌋,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ m. We consider a default probability
of 0.05% and let e1 = 0.000624375 and e2 = 0.009371875. The
total assets held by each IU is our last input and these values are:
1406.020, 1687.224 and 1124.816 (figures are in millions).
The optimisation problem (A.2) is run under two different
scenarios depending on the values of the recovery rates. In the
first case, we assume that all IU’s have the same recovery rate
of 0.5, while in the second case we assume that RecR1 = 0.5,
RecR2 = 0.6 and RecR3 = 0.4. The optimal solutions are displayed
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. It has been implicitly assumed that all
IU’s are already operating, so that the costs of opening a new
business unit are not included in this analysis. Otherwise, obtaining
geographic diversification by expanding the IG would need to take
into account the emerging friction costs.
We notice that the optimal risk transfer solutions are very
sensitive to the recovery rates of each IU. Although some ofthe weights remain the same (see for example the risk transfer
performed by the first IU for the first five LOB and for the last one),
most of them change. More importantly, we can analyse the effect
of these recovery rates by computing the gain from transferring
the risk versus the no-transfer case. We can define this gain as the
relative difference between the objective function evaluated based
on the optimal solutions and the trivial solution (i.e. xijk = 1, for
any i = j, and xijk = 0 for any i ≠ j). Under the same recovery
rate scenario, we notice that this difference is negligible, of around
5 · 10−6%. However, this is no longer the case for the second
scenario where the relative difference is around 0.01%. Thus, we
have constructed a numerical example in which we showed that
the recovery rate is an important factor in choosing the optimal risk
transfer between insurance undertakings, and the gain by taking
such a strategy can be quite significant.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have translated the capital requirements for a
non-life insurance companyoperatingunder Solvency II intomath-
ematical form and then considered the problemof determining the
efficient allocation of risk across LOB’s by following the most re-
cent Solvency II recommendations summarised in QIS5. The pro-
portional allocation represented the set of feasible risk transfers,
since the administration costs within the IG are very low andmore
importantly, due to the fact that proportional allocations are ac-
ceptable to local regulators. One may consider non-proportional
allocations that have a commercial purpose in order to be feasible
from the local regulators’ point of view, but sharing the premiums
in a ‘‘fair’’ manner is quite problematic andmoreover, the adminis-
tration costs may escalate. Therefore, non-proportional allocations
may not be profitable to the IG and future investigations may clar-
ify how beneficial it would be to an IG to allocate the risks in this
fashion.
The model contains a large number of parameters representing
the features of each IU and LOB.We have not shown the sensitivity
of the results to changes in all of the parameters since the optimal
allocation is not sensitive to many of the underlying parameters.
However, our work to date suggests that a key parameter is the
recovery rate assumed for each IU. For numerical purposes, weTable 3.3
Optimal intra-group transferring proportions for the problem defined in (A.2) with three IU with the same recovery
rates.
k LOBk x∗11k x
∗
21k x
∗
31k x
∗
12k x
∗
22k x
∗
32k x
∗
13k x
∗
23k x
∗
33k
1 Motor, third-party liability 0.10 0.90 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33
2 Motor, other classes 0.00 0.46 0.54 0.81 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.00
3 Marine, aviation, transport 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.00
4 Fire and other property damage 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.00
5 Third-party liability 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.34 0.54 0.46 0.00
6 Credit and suretyship 0.94 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.52 0.48
7 Legal expenses 0.16 0.68 0.16 0.34 0.38 0.28 0.57 0.00 0.43
8 Assistance 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.72 0.00 1.00 0.00
9 Miscellaneous 0.59 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.82 0.81 0.19 0.00Table 3.4
Optimal intra-group transferring proportions for the problem defined in (A.2) with three IU with different recovery
rates.
k LOBk x∗11k x
∗
21k x
∗
31k x
∗
12k x
∗
22k x
∗
32k x
∗
13k x
∗
23k x
∗
33k
1 Motor, third-party liability 0.64 0.17 0.19 0.77 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00
2 Motor, other classes 0.00 0.36 0.64 0.81 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.00
3 Marine, aviation, transport 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.81 0.50 0.00 0.50
4 Fire and other property damage 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.78 0.45 0.09 0.45
5 Third-party liability 0.43 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
6 Credit and suretyship 0.94 0.00 0.06 0.37 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 1.00
7 Legal expenses 0.00 0.74 0.26 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.79 0.00 0.21
8 Assistance 0.70 0.04 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
9 Miscellaneous 0.59 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.82 0.81 0.19 0.00
A.V. Asimit et al. / Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 66 (2016) 69–76 75have illustrated the model with a simple, but realistic case study.
This demonstrates that the optimisation routine does not lead
to a trivial solution, so weights xijk are not equal to one. In the
case study, we found that the optimal (total) capital requirements
(included in our objective function) does not change much in
relative terms (around 0.01%), but in absolute terms, the reduction
in the level of required capital could be significant for a large IG.
Acknowledgements
The authorswould like to thank an anonymous referee for help-
ing in improving the paper. The authorswould also like to acknowl-
edge the practitioner advice received fromDr. Peter England on the
choice of parameter values for themodel. The second authorwould
like to thank the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Coun-
cil of Canada (NSERC) for its continuing support.
Appendix
First, we note that the function f (·) from (3.1) is a convex
function onℜ2, and thus, any composition with an affine mapping
for f (·) is a convex function aswell, and in turn, the first term of the
objective function from Eq. (3.1) is a convex function. In addition,
the third term of the objective function from Eq. (3.1) is a convex
function as well. Therefore, we deal with a convex optimisation
problem as long as the simplified formulae from (2.9) holds. In
other words, for an IG with a ‘‘good’’ credit risk, we can rewrite
the optimisation problem as follows:
min
(x,u)∈ℜn×n×m×ℜn×m
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s.t.
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for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
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≤ Ai +

j≠i
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xijkajk − xjikaik

, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(A.1)
Here, the slack variables uik are introduced in order to produce an
implementable (differentiable and convex) optimisation problem.
Note that if relation (2.9) does not hold, there is an alternative
solution to our optimisation problem, namely a Mixed Integer
Nonlinear Programming (MINLP) formulation for (3.1) with the
restriction from (3.2). Therefore, (A.1) is now replaced by a MINLP
reformulation due to themin’s terms in both the objective function
and constraint. In order to remove this term we need to add the
binary variables yik ∈ A = {0, 1} and the slack variables vik. LetMbe a sufficiently large number. Then, the MINLP reformulation can
be argued as in Asimit et al. (2015) and is given by:
min
(x,y,u,v)∈ℜn×n×m×An×m×ℜn×m×ℜn×m
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for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
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(A.2)
Note that there are nonlinearities in both the objective function
and constraints in the (A.2), and thus, it is possible to not be able to
find an optimal solution in a reasonable time for large dimensional
problem. This is not the case for practical problems, where it is not
expected to have more than let say 10 IU’s, i.e. n ≤ 10. Since we
know that k ≤ 13, then even for large IG with 10 subsidiaries, the
dimension of our problemwould be 102×13+3×10×13 = 1690,
which can be efficiently accommodated by a commercial solver
such as GAMS. For example, in our case the optimal solution is
found in less than a second using an Intel Core i7-2600, 3.40 GHz
processor and 8 GB RAM.
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